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Abstract. Many large-scale Internet applications optimize their overlay
network to reduce latencies. Embedding coordinate systems like Vivaldi
are valuable tools for this new range of applications since they propose
light-weight algorithms that permit to estimate the latency between any
pair of nodes without having to contact them first. It has been recently
demonstrated that coordinate systems in general and Vivaldi in particu-
lar are sensible to attacks. Typically, nodes can lie about their coordinate
and distort the coordinate space. In this paper, we propose a formal rep-
utation model to detect misbehaving nodes and propose a reputation
adaptation of Vivaldi called RVivaldi. We evaluate the performance of
RVivaldi using the King dataset and show that RVivaldi is less sensitive
to malicious nodes than Vivaldi.
1 Introduction
During the last few years, many different application-level overlays have been
proposed to support new range of applications from file sharing to Voice over
IP (VoIP) and, more recently, IPTV. Most of these applications rely on the
network delay or round-trip times (RTTs) to ensure quality of service (QoS).
To limit resources consumption of the proximity measures, Internet coordinate
systems have been proposed to allow hosts to estimate delays without doing di-
rect measurements [1–3]. Every node of an Internet coordinate system computes
its coordinates into a geometric space such that the distance from itself to any
host predicts the latency – called distance – to that node. Ledlie et al. [4] have
shown coordinate systems are valuable tools for distributed systems depending
on the topology of the network. However, due to their slow convergence, coor-
dinate systems must be deployed as always-on services available for higher level
applications.
Content distribution and file sharing systems can benefit from network co-
ordinates in order to select a number of replicated servers to fetch a data item
from. Azureus, for instance, was the first large-scale real world application to
use a coordinate system. Open-source widely spread systems like Azureus may
interest attackers. One can imagine modifying Azureus client to alter the coordi-
nate space and disrupt the whole service or controlling all the traffic to achieve
a denial-of-service (DoS) attack.
Large-scale always-on services are prime target for attackers as disruption
may result in a mis-functioning of many applications or overlay. Kaafar et al.
have recently demonstrated that coordinate systems are sensible to attacks [5].
Kaafar et al. [5] have proposed to separate attacks on coordinate systems
in different categories. To summarize, one can say that there are two kinds of
attacks. The first one is performed when an honest node asks coordinates to a
malicious one. The malicious node replies with false coordinates resulting in a
bad latency prediction. Secondly, attackers disrupt the coordinates computation
process itself resulting in a deformation of the space of both honest and malicious
nodes (i.e., the predicted distances of the entire system are altered).
In this paper, we propose an extension to Vivaldi, called Reputation-based
Vivaldi (RVivaldi), that ensures the security of Vivaldi. The key idea of RVivaldi
is to add two new types of entities in the system: The RCA, a certificating agent,
and the surveyors that estimate the reputation of the classic nodes. We propose
a formal model of RVivaldi and validate it using the King data set used in [3].
We show that RVivaldi leads to a better accuracy of the coordinates than Vivaldi
in presence of malicious nodes.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Sec. 2 gives a brief
overview of Vivaldi, the embedding system on which this paper is based; Sec. 3
presents our reputation model for embedding systems and its application to
Vivaldi; Sec. 4 evaluates our solution. Finally, Sec. 5 summarizes this paper and
discusses further works.
2 Vivaldi
Vivaldi [3] does not require a fixed network infrastructure and make no distinc-
tions between nodes. A Vivaldi node collects distance information for a couple
of neighbors and computes its new coordinates with the collected measures. The
idea is that node i is represented as a unitary mass connected to each neighbor
j by a spring with the rest length set to the measured RTT (dij). The actual
length of the spring is the distance (dˆij) predicted by the coordinate space. A
spring always tries to have an actual length equals to its rest length. Thus if
dˆij is smaller than the measured RTT, the spring will push the two masses at-
tached to it. On the contrary, if the spring is too long, it will pull the masses
and reduce its actual length. The coordinates in Vivaldi are updated following
this principle. If we note −→x i the coordinates of i and −→x j the coordinates of j,
the new coordinates are computed as follows:




· u (−→x i −−→x j) . (1)
which must be understood as the displacement of the mass by a small part
of the displacement induced by the spring applying the Hooke’s law. δ, the
adaptative timestep, defines the fraction of the way the node is allowed to move
towards the perfect position for the current information. The timestep depends
on the local errors of the two nodes (ei and ej) and reduces the displacement if
the error is important. The timestep is defined by δ = cs ·ω where cs is a tuning
constant and ω = ei/(ei + ej). When a node has computed its new coordinates,
it computes its local error ei = es · ω + ei · (1− ω) where es is the relative error
defined by Eqn. 2. u (−→x i −−→x j) gives the direction of the displacement of i and
is normalized to 1.
es = |dij − dˆij |/dij . (2)
Eqn. 1 is the core of Vivaldi since it allows nodes to discover their coordinates.
3 Reputation-Based Vivaldi
3.1 A Reputation Model for Embedding Systems
The reputation of an entity A is the combination of trusts of all other entities
towards A and the trust is a subjective expectation that an agent has about
another’s future behavior based on the history of their encounters [6]. These
definitions suggest that reputation is global and objective while trust is local
and subjective. The trust is built on the experiences the agent observed about
A.
In traditional coordinate systems, any node A updates its coordinates based
on the coordinates of one of its neighbors and the distance to it. In our new
approach, the new coordinates also depend on the reputation of the neighbors.
When A updates its coordinates based on measurements with neighbor B, it
first contacts B to retrieve its coordinates and reputation. A then computes its
coordinates as a function of its own coordinates, B’s coordinates and B’s reputa-
tion. Then, A contacts a special certification agent, the Reputation Computation
Agent (RCA) to update its own reputation. This RCA is similar to the RCA
proposed by [7]. The RCA is used to construct a reliable reputation for any node
in the embedded system. For this, we follow the recently proposed approach by
Kaafar et al. [8] and introduce new entities in the system: The surveyors. A
few surveyors are attached to each node in the system. Surveyors are well cho-
sen nodes that perform experiences measurements and trust estimation on other
nodes. Next, the RCA computes its own trust to A’s surveyors. Finally, the RCA
computes the new reputation of A with all these parameters. The RCA intro-
duces scalability issue so that a solution must be found to allow replication of
this entity [9].
We now propose a more formal approach to the notions of experience, trust
and reputation.
Experience Model. At time t, an experience is an observation of a node A
about some behavior of another node B. This observation is evaluated as follows.
ξ(A,B, t) = 1−
∣∣∣dˆ(A,B, t)− d(A,B, t)∣∣∣
max
(
d(A,B, t), dˆ(A,B, t)
) . (3)
Where dˆ(A,B, t) is the estimated distance between A and B and d(A,B, t)
is the real distance. This metric is derived from the relative error (Eqn. 2).
The relative error gives information about the accuracy of the predicted dis-
tances. The lower the relatives errors are, the accurate the coordinates are. The
experience converts the relative error in the bounded interval [0, 1]. The experi-
ence is maximum for a perfect estimation and decreases with the augmentation
of the prediction error.
Trust Model. The trust A has in B is an expectation of the future behavior
of a node based on the previous experiences A had in B. However, the expe-
rience that we defined before depends on external elements and is inherently
not absolutely reliable. We use the concept of uncertain probabilities proposed
by Jφsang [10] to model this doubt. These uncertain probabilities introduce the
concepts of belief (b), disbelief (d) and uncertainty (u). The belief is the proba-
bility that the affirmation is true while the disbelief is the probability that this
affirmation is false. The uncertainty quantifies the doubt associated to the af-
firmation. These three concepts together compose an opinion which is a tuple
ω = (b, d, u) [11]. Belief, disbelief and uncertainty are linked together by the
belief function additivity which states that b + d + u = 1.
Conceptually, the trust must limit the risk of nodes using multiple identities.
It incites therefore nodes to remain in the system for a long time. However, the
trust must be reactive enough to adapt to sudden changes in the topology [7].
These requirements can be achieved by using the concept of trustworthiness. The
trustworthiness τ(A,B, t) of A in B at time t is an exponentially averaged sum
of the experiences [12] multiplied by an ageing factor:




(1− γ)i · ξ(A,B, t− i)
)
. (4)
where a(t) is the ageing factor (a(0) = 0), γ is a weighting constant and
h is the number of previous experiences that must be taken into account. The
exponentially averaged sum of the experiences gives more importance to the
most recent experiences [12]. The ageing factor increases with the seniority and
limits the trustworthiness of recent nodes (similar to the loss factor proposed
in [13]). It is defined as follows:
a(t) = ca + (1− ca) · a(t− 1). (5)
Where ca is the age bonus coefficient such that 0 < ca < 1 and a(0) = 0.
ca controls the gain of the age for the trust computation. The value of ca is a
tradeoff between wisdom and convergence time. A low value of ca implies a slow
convergence to 1, meaning that only old nodes may completely benefit from the
experiences. On the contrary, a large value quickly increases the ageing factor to
1 allowing recent nodes to use their entire experience rapidly.
The untrustworthiness, τ¯(A,B, t), is the complement to 1 of the trustworthi-
ness. The doubt ε(A,B, t) A has in B at time t is the variation of the experiences
with the time. This variation is estimated with the variance of the last h expe-
riences:




ξ (A,B, t− i)

 . (6)
The model of uncertain probabilities offers strong perspectives to the repu-
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Reputation Model. The reputation of an entity at a particular time must be
unique and must be a function of the trust that all nodes have in it. However, for
scalability reasons, it is impossible to construct a fully-meshed reputation model
where each node cooperates with all others to exchange trust information. We
therefore propose a pseudo-reputation model in which only a few nodes cooperate
to determine the reputation.
The uncertain probabilities model proposes two evidential operators [10, 11]:
discounting (⊗) and consensus (⊕). The first one can be seen as an operator of
transitivity and the second as an operator of averaging. Each node has a set of
well-chosen surveyors assigned to it [8]. The surveyors are normal nodes in the
system. A surveyor measures the experiences of its assigned nodes. When the
reputation of node A has to be updated, the RCA computes its trust in the A’s
surveyors and combines these trusts with the trust the surveyors have in A. This







Where ω˜RCAHn is the opinion the RCA has in Hn, the nth surveyor of A. In
this opinion, the experience is not computed with Eqn. 3 but with Eqn. 9. This
particular experience is introduced to avoid the RCA to have to compute its own
coordinates. Indeed, if the RCA had coordinates, it would be easy for an attacker
to alter the coordinates of the RCA and invalidate the reputation model.









−→v HnA (t) is the variation history. #
−→x is the size of the variation history vector
and n is a normalization factor computed by Eqn. 11. The variation history
vector is the history at time t of the last h variations of coordinates that the
RCA has observed for node A (see Eqn. 10). The intuition behind the division by
#−→v HnA (t) is that a large variance in a small set is more abnormal than a similar
variance in a large set. The normalization is used to bound the experience within
[0, 1].
−→v HnA (t) = 〈‖








We define the scalar reputation %ˆ
A
of a node A based on the opinion ωˆRCAA
in the equation 12.
%ˆ
A
= bˆRCAA · (1− uˆ
RCA
A ). (12)
The scalar reputation is the belief in A weighted by the doubt that persists
on that affirmation. A receives the scalar reputation as a time-limited ticket.
Hence, the RCA is never contacted to retrieve coordinates and does not become
a bottleneck [7]. The ticket is digitally signed by the RCA to avoid tampering.
More details about the ageing factor and reputation are given in [9].
3.2 Application to Vivaldi
It is possible to improve the robustness of Vivaldi by introducing the notion of
reputation in Eqn. 1 of Vivaldi which computes the new coordinates of B based
on the knowledge B has in A. This modification is presented in Eqn. 13.




· u (−→x B −−→x A) . (13)
Vivaldi has been proposed for environments without attackers and works well
in that case. The idea is to keep Vivaldi when the neighbor is reliable and to
limit the modification of coordinates if the neighbor is not reliable. When the
reputation is at its maximum (i.e., %ˆ
B
= 1), the modification is the same as
traditional Vivaldi. On the contrary, when the reputation is at its worst (i.e.,
%ˆ
B
= 0), the coordinates are not modified.
4 Evaluation
We validate our proposition using the King data set, as performed in the original
Vivaldi experimentation [3]. This data set gives a matrix of RTTs between 1740
nodes spread around the world. Our simulator considers 32 neighbors randomly
chosen among the entire set of 1740 nodes. The attackers (i.e., the malicious
nodes) are fixed at the beginning of the simulation. Attackers reply with random
coordinates each time a node asks coordinates. Such an attack is called a random
coordinates attack. Note that the reputation is protected such that a malicious
Fig. 1. Random coordinate attack: CDF of relative error at simulation tick = 4000
node cannot modify its own reputation. Only the RCA is able to modify a
reputation of the nodes and the RCA is perfectly reliable.
We consider the following proportion of malicious nodes among the entire
nodes set: 0% (i.e., there is no attack), 10%, 20%, 50% and 70%. We compare
the performance of classic Vivaldi with RVivaldi, as described in Sec. 3.2. The
constants used during the simulation are cc = 0.25, cs = 0.25, h = 10, γ = 0.5
and ca = 0.01. The coordinate space is the classic 3-dimensions Euclidean space.
The relative errors (Eqn. 2) are good estimators of the accuracy of the co-
ordinates. Fig. 1 shows the cumulative distribution of the relative error of the
victims of a random coordinates attack. The vertical axis is the cumulative frac-
tion of nodes and horizontal axis is the value of the relative error. In absence
of attackers, RVivaldi does not provide better results than Vivaldi. However,
when some malicious nodes are present, RVivaldi outperforms Vivaldi, whatever
the relative errors. For example, in presence of 20% of attackers, RVivaldi is as
accurate as Vivaldi in presence of only 10% of malicious nodes. RVivaldi mainly
outperforms Vivaldi for relative errors between 0.4 and 1.5. Regarding lower or
higher relative error, RVivaldi and Vivaldi converge in the same manner. This
error can be explained by the error introduced by the coordinate system itself.
A more precise evaluation of RVivaldi can be found in [9].
These results confirm that adding reputation to coordinate systems permit
to reduce the incidence of attacks on the accuracy of the whole system.
5 Conclusion
Coordinate systems, such as Vivaldi, might be used in various applications where
the notion of proximity, expressed as network delay or RTT, is used. However,
it has been recently shown that such a system is sensible to attacks. Indeed,
a malicious node can lie about its coordinates and, as a consequence, deform
the coordinate space. In this paper, we proposed a formal reputation model for
coordinate systems. The reputation gives an estimator of the probability a node
lies about its coordinates based on the previous experiences with this node.
In addition, we applied this model to Vivaldi and proposed RVivaldi, a repu-
tation adaptation of Vivaldi. We validated RVivaldi using the King data set and
showed that adding reputation to Vivaldi improves the accuracy of coordinates
in presence of malicious nodes.
In the near future, we aim at validating RVivaldi in a real environment,
such as PlanetLab. We further aim at confronting RVivaldi with all the attacks
proposed by Kaafar et al. [5]. Moreover, a solution must be proposed to secure
the surveyors and the RCA and to avoid it to be a single point of failure.
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